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Groping for Autonomy: The Federal Government 
and American Hospitals, 1950-1990 
Robert B. Hackey 
The contemporary U.S. health care system seems far removed from the pattern 
of professional dominance that characterized health care policymaking for most of 
the twentieth century. Prior to the 1960s, government involvement in the practice of 
medicine and in the financing of health care was severely limited in scope [Starr 
1982; Somers and Somers 1961]. Hospital reimbursement was managed by provid- 
ers through a private bargaining process with third-party payers. Blue Cross plans 
were the dominant third-party payers in most states by mid-century, but neither the 
Blues nor commercial insurers exercised significant countervailing power [Galbraith 
1956] as purchasers of health care. Blue Cross plans, in particular, were created as 
"hospital service corporations" to provide the hospital industry with a stable revenue 
stream and were not predisposed to challenge the autonomy of providers [Stevens 
1989]. Doctors and hospitals accepted new federal spending for hospital construc- 
tion, medical research, and improved access for the poor and elderly but success- 
fully resisted government efforts to regulate how these funds were spent. 
This article chronicles the slow but steady emergence of countervailing power in 
the hospital industry since mid-century. The transformation of American health care 
policymaking reflects the federal government's growing fiscal obligations as the sin- 
gle largest purchaser of health care. As John Kenneth Galbraith [1956, 113] notes, 
"Power on one side of a market creates both the need for, and the prospect of re- 
ward to, the exercise of countervailing power from the other side." The federal gov- 
ernment's effort to exercise countervailing power over health care providers shows 
no sign of abating in the future, for Medicare and Medicaid costs threaten the stabil- 
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ity of the balanced budget agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration and 
the Republican leadership of the 105th Congress. 
Concerns about rapidly rising health care costs led to the development of new in- 
stitutional arrangements that infringed upon the autonomy of hospitals over the past 
three decades. In effect, Congress authorized Medicare and Medicaid programs to 
exercise countervailing power in health care financing in an effort to control the spi- 
raling cost of federal entitlement programs. Policies that would have been unthink- 
able in the past-from the development of elaborate rate-setting methodologies to 
limitations on the capital investments and services of hospitals-were commonplace 
by the early 1980s [Brown 1986]. As health care costs continued to rise, hospitals 
chafed under an ever-increasing number of government regulations and controls. By 
the 1990s, decisions about the pricing and allocation of health services, standards of 
medical practice, and the profitability of providers increasingly rested in the hands 
of federal policymakers. 
The Birth of the Health Care Technostructure 
Health providers have successfully resisted frontal assaults on their professional 
autonomy for decades. Efforts to enact national health insurance, which would place 
the federal government in the position of a monopoly purchaser of health care, met 
with vociferous opposition during World War I and again in the 1930s and 1940s 
[Kelley 1956]. Opponents of national health insurance succeeded in defining public 
debate as a struggle between liberty and socialism, which threatened both the quality 
of patient care and the core values of American society [Numbers 1982; Hackey 
1997]. Although demand for health care declined during the Great Depression as 
consumers' purchasing power fell, few institutions existed to empower purchasers in 
the 1930s. 
Instead of bowing to federal control, health providers crafted new institutional 
arrangements to finance continued expansion of the health care system. As in other 
policy arenas, purchasing and regulatory institutions were organized and controlled 
by the providers themselves [see McConnell 1966; Lowi 1969]. The political and 
economic climate of the late 1940s and early 1950s was particularly well suited to 
the emergence of a health care technostructure, for "power passes to the techno- 
structure when technology and planning require specialized knowledge and group 
decision" [Galbraith 1971, 168]. Most hospitals served local markets in either a mo- 
nopolistic or oligopolistic fashion; competition among providers, where it existed, 
typically revolved around questions of "conspicuous consumption" related to the 
prestige of an institution's medical staff, the scope of its available services, and the 
availability of new technologies, rather than to the price of services. 
With encouragement from state insurance departments, hospitals responded to 
the fiscal challenges of the Great Depression by creating "hospital service corpora- 
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tions," commonly known as Blue Cross plans, to provide health service benefits to 
subscribers for an annual fee [Law 1976]. Unlike traditional forms of insurance, this 
arrangement set no fixed amount on total reimbursements for treatment, but rather 
agreed to cover a specified set of services for subscribers. Since the startup cost for 
such plans was subsidized by the participating hospitals themselves, both single hos- 
pital and community plans proliferated as a way to insure access to care for indi- 
viduals and a steady revenue stream for hospitals in the 1930s. The ability of the 
Blues to exercise countervailing power was further circumscribed by the American 
Hospital Association (AHA), which prohibited competition among Blue Cross 
plans; each was given monopoly control over a state or geographic area within a 
state. 
Since Blue Cross plans were closely tied to the hospital industry, most were nei- 
ther champions of cost containment nor strong advocates for restructuring the exist- 
ing health care system. A survey of state Blue Cross plans conducted by the U.S. 
Public Health Service in 1947 revealed that more than 70 percent of the board mem- 
bers who set policy for individual plans were affiliated with providers; 55 percent of 
all board members were representatives of the hospital industry, and an additional 
17 percent represented national, state, or local medical societies [Serbein 1953, 
119]. The creation of Blue Cross served an important purpose for hospitals, for it 
enabled the industry to maintain control over the pricing and use of its services. In a 
system where most institutions were reimbursed on a retrospective, fee-for-service 
basis with few controls over utilization, the hospital industry's revenue stream was 
secure. As Galbraith [1971, 199] notes, "Control of prices is for a purpose-for the 
security of the technostructure and to allow planned pursuit of its further goals. But 
price control does little to advance these goals unless there is also control over the 
amounts that are bought and sold at these prices." 
Prior to 1965, direct federal involvement in health care reimbursement and regu- 
lation was confined to several peripheral areas that had a limited effect on the na- 
tion's hospitals. With no compelling fiscal interest at stake, federal officials saw few 
reasons to challenge the professional autonomy of health providers. Third-party 
health insurance was virtually unknown, as the moral hazard associated with offer- 
ing open-ended health coverage dissuaded commercial insurers from entering the 
market [Starr 1982]. In short, while the economic turmoil facing hospitals in the 
1930s offered a promising opportunity to develop countervailing power in the health 
sector, most buyers were unorganized individual patients who were ill-equipped to 
capitalize on these circumstances. Efforts to rationalize the delivery of health care 
through the creation of prepaid group practices during this period provoked intense 
opposition from health providers [Starr 1982]. 
The prevailing policy image of health care presented a further impediment to the 
development of countervailing power capable of challenging provider dominance of 
the reimbursement process. The policy image of an issue or problem both explains 
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the nature of a problem and suggests potential solutions to it [Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991]. Policy images reflect a set of shared understandings-they define how 
policies are understood and discussed by the media, decision makers (e.g., members 
of Congress, the president), and the public. In particular, "by contriving an appro- 
priate image of the position, prospects, problems or dangers of the state the indus- 
trial system can insure a reaction favorable to its needs" [Galbraith 1971, 328]. For 
much of the twentieth century, additional spending on building new health care fa- 
cilities and expanding the range of services available to the public were seen in uni- 
formly positive terms. In 1932, the final report of the Committee on the Cost of 
Medical Care defined the nation's health policy agenda in terms of increasing access 
to care to all members of the population [Stevens 1989]. For health providers, this 
endorsement reflected a societal commitment to increasing investment in health care 
through additional support for research, infrastructure development, and the medical 
profession. 
The Committee's agenda was soon embraced by national policymakers, business 
leaders, and the public. A congruence of values among providers, policymakers, 
and the public is not unexpected, for "much of what is believed to be socially im- 
portant is, in fact, the adaptation of social attitudes to the goal system of the tech- 
nostructure. What counts here is what is believed" [Galbraith 1971, 163]. The 
positive policy image of health providers and of additional health care spending did 
not lend itself to the mobilization and organization of health care purchasers, allow- 
ing hospitals and their allies (e.g., Blue Cross plans) to dominate the reimbursement 
process. A solid majority of citizens endorsed the expansion of voluntary health in- 
surance coverage; free medical care for mothers, infants, and the needy; and expan- 
sion of the Social Security system to include sickness benefits [Erskine 1975]. 
Concerns over access, not cost containment, also dominated the health policy 
agenda in Congress during the 1940s and l950s, as issue entrepreneurs sought to 
expand coverage to underserved groups and to increase the supply of physicians and 
hospitals. 
The Politics of Accomodation: Federal Health 
Care Policies in the 1940s and 1950s 
The federal government's early forays into health care financing were relatively 
innocuous from the perspective of health providers. During the 1930s, the federal 
Works Progress Administration constructed and renovated hundreds of hospitals na- 
tionwide. The Lanham Act, passed in 1941, provided more than $120 million to 
build or upgrade hospital facilities in geographic areas where defense plants and 
military bases were located as part of the war effort [see Stevens 1989, 208-11]. In 
the 1940s and 1950s, federal health policies were aimed at winning the political sup- 
port of constituents and health providers, both of whom clamored for more, not 
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less, spending on health care. Beginning in the late 1940s, the Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act of 1946, best known as the Hill-Burton program, provided federal 
funds for the construction and modernization of hospital facilities and imposed few 
binding restrictions on providers [Lave and Lave 1974]. Federal programs subsi- 
dized care for the indigent and poor elderly, provided health services to Indian 
tribes under the aegis of the Indian Health Service, and cared for veterans and mili- 
tary personnel through a separate system of hospitals operated by the Veterans' Ad- 
ministration and the respective military services [Serbein 1953]. At the same time, 
federal support for basic medical research expanded at a rapid pace under the aus- 
pices of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Federal research funds were also 
used to purchase inpatient hospital care for indigent patients undergoing diagnostic 
testing for cancer, tuberculosis, and venereal disease through programs administered 
by the National Cancer Institute and the U.S. Public Health Service [Serbein 1953, 
257-60]. None of these initiatives challenged the prerogatives or autonomy of 
providers-all were popular distributive programs that enjoyed widespread public 
and congressional support. 
The Hill-Burton program was designed to increase public access to quality health 
care services by subsidizing hospital construction. Since the prevailing view from 
the 1940s through the mid-1960s was that increased access to medical care would 
improve the overall health of the population, federal health policies during this pe- 
riod increased spending on health care facilities and personnel. Although Hill-Bur- 
ton was intended to target benefits to rural and underserved areas, the immense 
popularity of hospital construction led Congress to spread program funding through- 
out their districts, rather than funneling funds to poorer, rural areas. Hill-Burton 
made it possible for members of Congress to claim credit for worthy projects in 
their districts on an annual basis; during the first five years of the program, more 
than 1,700 separate projects were approved, adding more than 80,000 hospital beds 
across the nation at a cost of more than $400 million [Serbein 1953, 276-77]. 
Federal support for increasing health care facilities, personnel, and research dur- 
ing this period reflects Galbraith's [1971, 164] observation that "successful planning 
in areas of expensive and sophisticated technology requires that the state underwrite 
costs, including the costs of research and development, and that it insure a market 
for the resulting products." Federal policies ensured that consumer demand for 
health care services would continue to rise, for unions were encouraged to bargain 
for health insurance and other nonwage "fringe benefits" in lieu of additional com- 
pensation during the wartime economy of the 1940s to slow inflationary pressures 
on wages. Private health insurance coverage expanded rapidly during the 1950s, 
prompting many critics of national health insurance to suggest that comprehensive 
federal reform was no longer needed [Hackey 1997]; by the mid-1950s, more than 
100 million Americans were covered by private health insurance [Stevens 1971]. 
Health care financing during this period illustrates Galbraith's [1971, 299] observa- 
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tion that "the line between public and private authority in the industrial system is in- 
distinct, and in large measure imaginary." Over the course of a decade, hospitals 
succeeded in securing federal subsidies for new construction projects, lowered the 
cost of charity care, and increased the ability of the poor elderly to purchase their 
services. 
The first direct federal involvement in provider reimbursement came in 1950, 
when Congress authorized a system of "vendor payments" to compensate health 
providers for free care given to persons receiving public assistance. As Rosemary 
Stevens notes [1989, 269], "The advent of vendor payments, with their direct as- 
sumption of government purchase of care . . . assumed, in effect, that private char- 
ity giving to the poor-Thy hospitals and physicians-ought to be unnecessary." This 
assumption became the unofficial dogma within the hospital industry and was 
adopted by both the federal government and AHA as the proper method for reim- 
bursing hospitals for the cost of charity care (later known as uncompensated care). 
The passage of the Kerr-Mills program in 1960 expanded the federal government's 
role in providing coverage for the poor by subsidizing medical care for the elderly 
through federal matching funds provided to state medical assistance programs. 
While neither vendor payments nor the Kerr-Mills program had an appreciable im- 
pact on the financing of health services, both legitimated federal involvement in the 
financing of health care. 
The implementation of vendor payments and Kerr-Mills, however, raised the ire 
of providers over what they perceived to be inadequate reimbursement for the costs 
associated with furnishing charity care. In an effort to define the terms of relation- 
ships between hospitals and purchasers of health care, the AHA published its Princi- 
ples for the Payment of Hospital Care in 1953. The Principles established retro- 
spective, cost-based reimbursement as the industry's standard operating procedure 
and declared that hospitals should be reimbursed for the full cost of treating a pa- 
tient. Under this system, which was subsequently adopted by Blue Cross plans and 
endorsed by both the federal vendor payments and the Kerr-Mills program, purchas- 
ers of health care had little market leverage to control either the price or the utiliza- 
tion of health care services. 
Each of the principal federal initiatives in the two decades following the end of 
World War II served important purposes for providers without threatening their 
autonomy. Federal investment in hospital construction under the Hill-Burton pro- 
gram simultaneously addressed the desire of providers for additional capital invest- 
ment, of physicians for more sophisticated "workshops" [Pauly and Redisch 1973], 
and the public's concerns about improving access to care, particularly in the na- 
tion's poor and rural communities. The expansion of the Veterans' Administration 
hospital system and its close affiliation with graduate medical programs provided 
medical school faculty and students with a steady supply of patients on which to 
practice their skills. Finally, the federal government's role as a third-party payer 
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during this period, through both the vendor-payments program and Kerr-Mills, re- 
lieved hospitals of the fiscal burden associated with providing care for the indigent 
and the poor elderly. Federal investments, with few strings attached, won praise 
from providers as sound public policy and served an important electoral purpose for 
members of Congress. 
The Dominance of the Health Care Technostructure 
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid marked a turning point in organized 
medicine's influence over health care policymaking. The American Medical Asso- 
ciation's (AMA) strident opposition to any form of "socialized medicine" in the 
years leading up to 1965 made both administration officials and congressional lead- 
ers wary of alienating providers in drafting health legislation [Jacobs 1992]. In an 
effort to accommodate providers' concerns, the initial design of the Medicare reim- 
bursement system reflects Galbraith's [1971, 307] observation that "[the modern 
corporation] has won an accommodation by the state to its needs that is highly fa- 
vorable." While federal policymakers' decisions to accelerate depreciation of capital 
projects and to adopt the AHA's Principles for the Payment of Hospital Care as the 
basis for provider payment under Medicare and Medicaid ensured a smooth takeoff 
for the programs [Feder 1977; Thompson 1981], they ignited an inflationary spiral 
in the health care industry. The passage, and subequent implementation, of Medi- 
care marked the zenith of the hospitals' influence over health care policy. 
The "adaptation of public goals to the goals of the technostructure" [Galbraith 
1971, 312] occurred throughout the implementation process, as strong provider rep- 
resentation on the principal advisory bodies enabled hospitals and physicians to ad- 
vocate for advantageous financing arrangements. Nowhere was this pattern of 
accommodation more visible than in the implementation of Medicare. Provider in- 
put was solicited for all key decisions regarding reimbursement, utilization, stand- 
ards of care, and the certification of physicians, hospitals, and home health 
providers [Feder 1977]. Veiled threats about a provider boycott of Medicare, which 
could potentially cripple the program and embarrass the administration, continued 
throughout the year-long rule-making process leading up to the program's startup. 
The administration's concerns about a boycott of the program were reflected in the 
organization of the Bureau of Hospital Insurance's (BHI) principal advisory coun- 
cils-the Health Insurance Benefits Advisory Council (HIBAC) and the National 
Medical Review Committee (NMRC). The HIBAC mediated disputes among 
providers, third-party health insurers, and SSA officials and considered all issues re- 
lating to the organization, financing, and delivery of program services in the year 
before program startup. As one of the primary policy incubators for Medicare's 
rule-making process, the HIBAC afforded providers significant leverage over the 
implementation process, for nine of the council's sixteen members were physicians 
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[Somers and Somers 1967, 32]. Although the membership of the NMRC had not 
been appointed before the program's startup, the enabling legislation mandated that 
a majority of the committee's nine members must be physicians and that other mem- 
bers should be selected from "organizations and associations of professional person- 
nel in the field of medicine and other individuals who are outstanding in the field of 
medicine or related fields; except that at least one member shall be representative of 
the general public" [Somers and Somers 1967, 31-32]. 
In this context, federal officials were reluctant to fully exercise their newfound 
leverage over health providers. Although Lawrence Jacobs [1992] suggests that pub- 
lic opinion strongly influenced the implementation of Medicare, the development of 
Medicare's retrospective cost-based reimbursement system using fiscal intermediar- 
ies reflects James Q. Wilson's [1980, 369] description of client politics, in which an 
"easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize 
and lobby; the costs and benefits are distributed at a low per capita rate over a large 
number of people, and thus they have little incentive to organize in opposition-if 
indeed, they even hear of the policy." 
If hospitals had lost the war over extending health insurance to the elderly in 
1965 (see Marmor [1971] for an excellent account), they won the first battles over 
reimbursement in the years that followed. The end result was a boon for the indus- 
try. In addition to extending insurance coverage to a large segment of the population 
that had historically underutilized medical services, hospitals won federal reim- 
bursement for the indirect costs of patient care such as capital expenditures and de- 
preciation [Somers 1969]. Although the BHI determined eligibility and paid for 
Medicare subscribers' benefits, responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the 
program was delegated to "fiscal intermediaries," 90 percent of which were Blue 
Cross plans. Proponents of the concept argued that both Medicare and the hospitals 
would "benefit from the relationships [the intermediaries] have established with hos- 
pitals, physicians and others who furnish health care" [Feder 1977, 37]. 
Utilization review audits to ensure that providers did not overcharge Medicare 
for unnecessary services were also conducted by intermediaries, thus linking re- 
sponsibility for payment and oversight within an administrative structure dominated 
by health providers. Furthermore, since providers were free to contract with their 
choice of fiscal intermediaries to handle Medicare claims processing, a Blue Cross 
plan that tried to "get tough" with hospitals on issues of quality and cost contain- 
ment could find itself without a contract. Without strong incentives to act otherwise, 
few Blue Cross plans risked the financial benefits from their status as intermediaries 
to do the government's dirty work; most accommodated, rather than antagonized, 
hospitals. 
Following the practice of most Blue Cross plans, Medicare agreed to reimburse 
hospitals on the basis of "usual, customary and reasonable" (UCR) fees and charges 
within a geographic area. This mode of reimbursement was decidedly inflationary, 
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for as the average fee level rose in an area, so did the definition of what qualified as 
usual, customary, and reasonable. Hospitals had no incentive to limit the growth of 
costs, for to do so would reduce revenues. Instead, hospitals saw Medicare as a 
source of funds for capital expansion and aggressively pressed for reimbursement on 
a 'cost-plus" basis, arguing that even nonprofit institutions needed a modest surplus 
over their operating expenses to provide capital for renovation, expansion, and re- 
search [Somers 1969]. Providers reached a compromise with federal officials that 
added an additional 2 percent to Medicare reimbursements to cover "other costs" as- 
sociated with providing care to program beneficiaries. As a result of this compro- 
mise, Medicare pumped millions of additional dollars into hospital coffers with no 
strings attached, setting off a hospital construction bonanza in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s; Medicare's payments to hospitals grew from $891 million in 1966 to 
$4.7 billion in 1969. 
The End of Consensus 
After 1965, the policy image of health care changed as decision makers and the 
public came to view additional spending on health care as a "crisis" that had to be 
controlled, rather than as an "investment" in needed programs for underserved seg- 
ments of the population. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid gave federal offi- 
cials a direct interest in health care cost containment. The health care cost explosion 
in the years after 1965 led to fundamental changes in the relationship between public 
officials and providers and other societal interests. As the policy image of health 
care shifted, the interests of elected officials shifted as well; rising costs provided 
federal officials with a reason to intervene in the fiscal affairs of the hospital indus- 
try for the first time. Beginning in the late 1960s, cost-conscious federal policymak- 
ers looked to new institutions to exercise leverage over the industry, placing 
government increasingly at odds with the hospital industry technostructure. Initial 
restrictions on providers in the 1960s and 1970s were modest, but the scope of fed- 
eral "rationalizing strategies" to control the rapidly rising cost of entitlement pro- 
grams expanded over time. By the 1980s, the line between government at both the 
state and federal levels and the technostructure was increasingly clear, as public of- 
ficials embraced the pursuit of hospital cost containment in a "government-led 
search for solutions to government's own problems" [Brown 1983, 45]. Until gov- 
ernment officials possessed the statutory authority to exercise leverage over the fis- 
cal affairs of hospitals, power over health care policymaking remained squarely in 
the hands of providers. 
Robert Higgs [1987] contends that crisis, either perceived or real, is a precondi- 
tion for the expansion of government authority. When policy debates are defined by 
the rhetoric of crisis, ideological opposition to the use of public authority breaks 
down as the public becomes anxious for government to "do something" to cope with 
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the crisis. The rhetoric of crisis has been a common feature in health care policy- 
making over the past three decades. As policymakers, the mass public, and the me- 
dia trumpeted the system's ills, opportunities arose for resourceful policy 
entrepreneurs to assemble coalitions in support of expanding public authority over 
the hospital industry. 
As Congress began to view health care expenditures as budget busters, rather 
than as investments, legislators approved a variety of cost-control experiments in an 
effort to limit rising entitlement spending. To do so, Congress created new institu- 
tional structures, centralized decision-making authority over hospital reimbursement 
and capital investment, and invested state and federal regulatory agencies with new 
statutory mandates and policy tools to increase their leverage over health providers 
and third-party payers. Since countervailing power was effectively absent from 
health care financing, the federal government used its growing market share to 
reshape the health care market in the 1970s and 1980s. Federal policies toward 
health care financing in the years since 1965 can be seen as a series of attempts to 
cope with the compromises made during the implementation of Medicare and Medi- 
caid [Brown 1983]. After 1965, federal and state governments became the largest 
purchasers of hospital services, providing public officials with a direct and immedi- 
ate interest in controlling the price of medical services. 
The process of creating countervailing power in the health care industry, how- 
ever, was incremental and slow. Federal policymakers faced the difficult task of 
building the government's regulatory and planning capacity in a political environ- 
ment dominated by health providers. Early government efforts to regulate the hospi- 
tal industry resembled Stephen Skowronek's [1982] description of American 
political development during the late nineteenth century, in which new institutions 
developed, but "governmental elites could not sustain support for efforts that threat- 
ened to undermine long-established political and institutional relationships." 
The Trials and Tribulations of Health Planning 
Health planning appeared to offer a palatable solution to "rationalize" the organi- 
zation and financing of health services in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The em- 
phasis on planning by both federal and state governments was largely a by-product 
of Milton Roemer's [1961] dictum that a bed built is a bed filled; doctors and hospi- 
tals could, in essence, fill empty beds by increasing the demand for hospital services 
in their choice of treatments [see Pauly and Redisch 1973]. Since patients were insu- 
lated from the true cost of treatment by extensive hospital insurance coverage [Feld- 
stein 1971; Pauly 1980, 17-20], neither doctors, hospitals, nor patients had an 
incentive to restrict utilization of hospital facilities. If Roemer was correct, the logi- 
cal solution to rising utilization and health care costs would be to restrict the growth 
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of hospital facilities in the expectation that "a bed not built is a bed not used" [Dun- 
ham 1981]. 
The federal government's first effort to coordinate health care services under the 
Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 [Pub. L. 89-749] has been described 
as a "half-hearted commitment" that achieved few tangible results [West and 
Stevens 1976, 175]. The Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) Act created a plan- 
ning and regulatory program on training wheels; planning agencies were dominated 
by provider groups, lacked technical expertise, and had little legal authority to en- 
force compliance with the state and local plans they developed. Since federal fund- 
ing for planning agencies was contingent upon the ability of state and local matching 
funds, many CHP agencies were dependent on hospitals and third-party payers for 
funding, data analysis, and even basic information about the functioning of local 
health care systems [West and Stevens 1976, 179]. Given the ambiguity of the stat- 
ute, state and local planners had few incentives to pursue cost control, for both state 
and local planning agencies emphasized needs assessment and the identification of 
opportunities for resource sharing and cooperation. When viewed in this light, the 
federal government's first attempt to control costs via health planning bears out Gal- 
braith's prediction that a "fusion" of tasks would develop between the technostruc- 
ture and the state. Pub. L. 89-749 illustrated how "members of the technostructure 
work closely with their public counterparts . . . in advising them of their needs" 
[Galbraith 1971, 395]. 
Federal regulation of the hospital industry increased markedly after the passage 
of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act in 1974 [Pub. L. 93-641] es- 
tablished more than 200 federally funded local health planning agencies. These new 
health systems agencies (HSAs), working in concert with state health planning and 
resource development agencies (SHPDAs), were responsible for assessing regional 
health needs and were expected to regulate the construction and expansion of new 
health care facilities. Planners, however, lacked the authority to impose effective 
sanctions upon hospitals [Vladeck 1979]. Even their supporters acknowledged that 
the new agencies were beset by multiple (and often conflicting) goals, lacked the 
requisite authority to pursue these goals, and offered budding planners few incen- 
tives to engage in trench warfare with local hospitals [Luft and Frisvold 1979]. In 
addition, as Harvey Sapolsky [1991, 822] argues, "Physicians, and more relevantly, 
hospital administrators, quickly discovered that the planning system could be outma- 
neuvered. The system was not much of an obstacle once the consultants were called 
in to advise." 
State and federal certificate-of-need (CON) programs suffered from the same 
shortcoming as systemwide planning efforts; both placed too much hope on a pro- 
gram with multiple objectives to control health care costs [see Brown 1981; Bovb- 
jerg 1988]. CON programs offered state and federal officials a tool to influence the 
decisions of health care providers to expand or modify existing facilities and serv- 
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ices, but efforts to decertify beds or restrict the diffusion of profitable new technolo- 
gies were vehemently opposed by health providers [Carpenter and Paul-Shaheen 
1984]. States with aggressive CON programs soon found themselves in court, as 
providers challenged the statutory authority of state and local planning agencies, the 
representativeness of HSAs, and the interpretation of state-enabling legislation and 
health-planning documents. Furthermore, the most critical decisions-those that af- 
fected the level of reimbursement for hospital services-remained beyond the scope 
of planners' jurisdiction. 
Despite the limitations of the planning process created by Pub. L. 93-641, HSAs 
opened up the decision-making process to new groups. Since a majority of repre- 
sentatives on local planning bodies were required to be "consumers"-defined in 
practice as non-providers--business leaders and citizens with no formal ties to the 
health care industry became increasingly active in health policy debates during the 
1970s and 1980s. Uncertainty reigned as new groups clamored for seats at the table 
and existing groups fought for representation to protect their interests [Marmor and 
Morone 1981]. 
The Prospects and Pitfalls of Price Regulation 
Even before the passage of the Health Planning and Resource Development Act 
of 1974, Congress began to experiment with other institutional levers to control 
health care costs. While health planning programs garnered the lion's share of atten- 
tion during the 1970s, federal officials were quietly reshaping the mechanisms used 
to pay health providers. Health care financing reforms over the past two decades 
emerged from a set of arrangements aptly described by Lawrence Brown [1985] as a 
process of "technocratic corporatism" in which payers, providers, and government 
bureaucrats bargained over technical modifications to the payment system. In retro- 
spect, Clark Havighurst's [1986] assertion that decision making in health care would 
increasingly devolve to the consumers of health services proved to be correct, but in 
an unexpected fashion. Far from the decentralized market system driven by individ- 
ual choice that was envisioned by supporters of procompetitive reform, power de- 
volved into the hands of the largest "consumers"-federal and state governments. 
The result was a "refederalization" of health care decision making, rather than the 
decentralization anticipated by conservatives [Rabe 1987]. 
The federal government's first efforts to limit its financial exposure were aimed 
at undoing some of the excesses that accompanied the implementation of Medicare 
and Medicaid. The first target of federal cost-cutters was the 2 percent "plus factor" 
granted to providers to provide working capital for facilities improvements and new 
services. While repeal of the plus factor in 1969 irked providers, it did nothing to 
change the fundamental design of the Medicare payment system. The first substan- 
tial change in Medicare's relationship with health providers did not come until the 
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passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1972 [Pub. L. 92-603]. Section 223 
of the 1972 Social Security Act introduced a prospective component to Medicare re- 
imbursement that limited the federal government's reimbursement of "allowable 
costs" for inpatient care to 120 percent of the mean for such costs for a peer group 
of hospitals. While the cap was gradually lowered to 108 percent of mean costs be- 
tween 1975 and 1982, the Section 223 limits placed no restrictions on reimburse- 
ment for "nonroutine" operating costs associated with interest payments, depre- 
ciation, or the cost of ancillary services [Office of Technology Assessment 1986, 
23]. 
The cap's effectiveness was limited, for the system remained primarily retro- 
spective and cost-based; Section 223 was intended to provide high-cost "outlier" in- 
stitutions with an incentive to hold down costs. Hospitals whose charges did not 
deviate significantly from their peer group mean were largely unaffected by these 
changes. Despite its limited scope, Section 223 marked a radical departure from 
past policy-for the first time, the federal government placed a prospective cap on 
hospital reimbursement, which affected a significant percentage of the institutional 
caseload. Section 1122 of the Social Security Amendments also strengthened the 
hand of state and local planning agencies by prohibiting the use of federal funds to 
reimburse the capital expenditures of providers for "unnecessary" projects that had 
not received prior approval from state planning agencies. Although relatively few 
institutions were adversely affected by these changes, Pub. L. 92-603's limits on al- 
lowable costs and its restrictions on capital-expenditure reimbursement represented 
a fundamental break from the principles of cost-based reimbursement developed by 
the industry over the previous two decades. 
The Social Security Amendments of 1972 also produced another significant re- 
form that would have widespread ramifications for the regulation of the hospital in- 
dustry over the next decade. While the provisions of Section 223 were aimed at 
outlier hospitals whose costs far exceeded national peer-group averages, Section 222 
of the 1972 act authorized the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) to fund demonstration projects and experiments to test various cost-contain- 
ment measures that would apply to all hospitals in a geographic area. Under the 
terms of the demonstration projects, HEW agreed to absorb any losses it might in- 
cur if the experiments failed to achieve their cost-control targets and actual costs 
proved to be higher than under HEW's own reimbursement methodology. In the 
long run, Section 222 had a tremendous impact on health care regulation and reim- 
bursement policies, for it encouraged the proliferation of state rate-setting experi- 
ments during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
State-level experimentation redefined the relationships between payers, provid- 
ers, and government regulatory agencies, particularly in states where all hospital 
revenues were subject to control by state regulatory agencies [Hackey 1998]. All 
payer rate-setting programs achieved considerable cost savings and limited the abil- 
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ity of hospitals to shift costs from regulated payers (usually state Medicaid pro- 
grams) to unregulated commercial insurers and paying patients [Coelen et al. 1988]. 
In addition to strengthening the hand of state health care bureaucracies, however, 
the demonstration projects funded under Section 222 provided HEW officials with 
opportunities for extensive policy learning. The full impact of the Section 222 
waiver process was not felt nationwide until 1983, when Medicare incorporated the 
lessons of New Jersey's prospective hospital rate-setting methodology as the basis 
for its new prospective payment system (PPS). 
Health care inflation occupied the attention of policymakers throughout the 
1970s, as increases in hospital prices consistently outstripped the general inflation 
rate. After wage and price controls were lifted in 1974, hospital costs increased by 
$14.5 billion from 1974 to 1975, the largest single-year increase in the nation's his- 
tory [Congressional Quarterly 1978, 500]. Medicare outlays for hospital insurance 
increased by 387 percent in the decade following the 1972 Social Security Amend- 
ments, from $6.8 billion in FY1973 to $33.3 billion in FY1982; inpatient hospital 
care accounted for more than 65 percent of all Medicare program reimbursements 
by 1984 [HCFA 1988, 20-21]. 
After taking office, President Jimmy Carter made hospital cost control one of his 
top legislative priorities. In 1977, the president proposed the most ambitious attempt 
to regulate the hospital industry to date; the administration's proposed legislation 
(H.R. 6575/S. 1391) sought to cap hospital revenue growth from all sources to a 9 
percent annual rate and imposed strict limits on the construction of new health care 
facilities. Carter actively campaigned for the bill, promising that its passage would 
"slow a devastating inflationary trend, which doubles health costs every five 
years. . . . The cost of [health] care is rising so rapidly it jeopardizes our health 
goals and our other important social objectives" [Congressional Quarterly 1978, 
499-500]. Providers, however, argued that such extensive federal intervention was 
unnecessary. Hospital industry officials expressed confidence that the industry could 
control costs through "voluntary restraint." In 1979, Congress decided to give the 
industry a chance to prove itself, ending further discussion of federal price controls. 
The Legitimation of Behavioral Controls on the Hospital Industry 
The effort at voluntary restraint by hospitals was a spectacular failure, which se- 
verely undermined the industry's credibility in Congress; national expenditures for 
hospital care rose 36 percent, from $87.9 billion in 1979 to $119.6 billion in 1981, 
while Medicare outlays for hospital services rose 45.6 percent in the same period, 
from $21.7 billion in 1979 to $31.6 billion in 1981 [Chulis 1991, 196]. Passage of 
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 [Pub. L. 97-248] 
sounded the death knell for the system of retrospective, cost-based reimbursement 
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that the hospital industry had fought to preserve [Office of Technology Assessment 
1986, 23]. 
TEFRA imposed the most significant limitations on Medicare payments to 
providers since the program's inception in 1965 by extending the Section 223 limits 
to include ancillary departments and special care units and by imposing an absolute 
ceiling on reimbursement for costs associated with providing inpatient care. Under 
the TEFRA reimbursement formula, hospitals would only be reimbursed for the 
lower of a prospectively set target rate or 120 percent of the average cost per case 
for a peer group of hospitals [Office of Technology Assessment 1986, 23]. The new 
measures also provided an incentive for hospitals to improve the efficiency of their 
operations, since costs above the cap would not be reimbursed. In addition, TEFRA 
marked the federal government's first use of a hospital's case mix to determine in- 
patient reimbursement. Hospital per diem costs were adjusted for both the type and 
severity of illness on the basis of a classification system that grouped similar medi- 
cal procedures into "diagnosis-related groups" (DRGs). DRGs were developed in 
the mid-1970s by researchers at Yale University Medical School to separate inpa- 
tient hospital procedures into a fixed number of diagnostic categories. Since patients 
in a DRG have similar clinical conditions that require similar treatments, they are 
expected to consume roughly comparable amounts of a hospital's resources. 
TEFRA signaled the federal government's new willingness to use the rate of re- 
imbursement as a lever to bring hospital costs under control. The growing burden of 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs led federal officials to pursue cost contain- 
ment, despite howls of protest from the hospital industry and health providers. The 
rationalizing politics of cost containment underscored a growing divergence in the 
political interests of federal policymakers and the health care technostructure. Be- 
ginning in 1982, for the first time, a significant fraction of hospitals' revenues were 
determined on a prospective, rather than a retrospective, basis. The switch to pro- 
spective reimbursement was significant from a state-building perspective, for the 
adoption of a prospective payment system shifted control over hospital reimburse- 
ment from providers to the Health Care Financing Administration. Under the new 
system, federal bureaucrats, not hospital administrators, set reimbursement rates for 
all inpatient hospital services. 
The TEFRA limits were viewed as a threat by the hospital industry because 
Medicare's new formula paid for hospital services largely on the basis of institu- 
tions' average costs. The federal government's new approach to hospital reimburse- 
ment led to the political fragmentation of the hospital industry, for while all 
hospitals benefited from the cost-based, retrospective system of reimbursement, 
some institutions fared well under prospective payment, while others struggled. As 
long as providers could earn additional revenues by passing along higher costs to the 
federal government, few incentives existed for institutions to reorganize their deliv- 
ery of care. By setting a national average payment rate and adjusting payments to 
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providers to account for differences in their patients' severity of illness, TEFRA pit- 
ted the interests of urban teaching hospitals and trauma centers, which treated sicker 
than average patients, against many of their suburban and for-profit counterparts. 
Under TEFRA and its successor, a hospital's profitability was closely tied to its 
ability to keep costs below the pre-established rate of payment. To do so, hospitals 
treated a growing proportion of their patients on an "outpatient" basis to limit the 
use of resources, cut staffing, and sought to squeeze out additional economies in 
purchasing and "discharge planning" to minimize patients' length of stay [Iglehart 
1993]. 
Ballooning deficits contributed to the new rhetoric of crisis and legitimated pol- 
icy choices that had been politically infeasible five years earlier. Commitment to 
cost control was a bipartisan matter in the 1970s and 1980s, as the most sweeping 
price regulations to date in the health sector were introduced in 1982 and 1983 at 
the behest of a conservative Republican president who had campaigned on a plat- 
form of reducing government regulation and intervention in the private sector. 
TEFRA was a radical departure from past practice, which placed many hospitals 
that treated a sicker than average (i.e., high-cost) patient population at a consider- 
able disadvantage. TEFRA did not represent a temporary inconvenience for health 
providers, as Pub. L. 97-248 directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to recommend to Congress a more permanent prospective reimbursement 
system for inpatient care under Medicare by 1983. 
HHS had relatively few options to choose from in suggesting a comprehensive 
reform of Medicare's hospital payment policies. The one option that had been 
widely discussed within the department, however, was New Jersey's ongoing all- 
payer rate-setting experiment using DRGs. HCFA had pressed New Jersey officials 
to adopt a DRG-based system in the late 1970s to explore the feasibility of a case- 
based prospective payment system for inpatient hospital care [Morone and Dunham 
1985]. Given its limited time frame and the absence of other viable options, HHS 
recommended in its December 1982 report to Congress that Medicare phase in a 
prospective reimbursement system modeled after the HCFA demonstration project 
in New Jersey. Medicare's new (PPS) was passed as part of the 1983 Social Secu- 
rity Amendments (Pub. L. 98-2 1) amid little debate after a brief four-month gesta- 
tion period in Congress. The passage of Medicare's PPS followed a familiar 
pattern, as the hospital industry technostructure ndorsed the plan and worked with 
key congressional leaders and administration officials to develop the new DRG- 
based payment system. Like the previous reforms of the nation's health care financ- 
ing system during the 1970s, PPS emerged out of a relatively closed, "technocratic" 
bargaining process that received little attention from the media or the mass public 
[Brown 1985]. 
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A Fraying AUliance between Hospitals and the Federal Government 
Hospital industry representatives welcomed the change from the crude and re- 
strictive payment criteria provided under TEFRA, for PPS's treatment of case-mix 
differences among hospitals represented a significant advance over the previous 
methodology; the proposal won the endorsement of the AHA and the Federation of 
American Hospitals. PPS payment rates were initially set at a high level to allay 
provider fears of fiscal catastrophe under the new system. Indeed, the Medicare 
margins (i.e., net operating profits) for all hospitals exceeded 14 percent during the 
program's first two years, as Medicare payments per hospital discharge increased 
by 18.6 percent in FY1985 and 10.5 percent in FY1986 [Altman 1995]. Generous 
reimbursement rates in the first three years of PPS led to record profits in the hospi- 
tal industry, as the net operating margin for Medicare patients exceeded 10 percent 
[Russell 1989] and total revenue margins for community hospitals exceeded 5 per- 
cent from 1984 to 1986. The rising tide lifted all boats, for hospitals in all owner- 
ship categories reported positive Medicare margins in FY1985 and FY1986 [Altman 
1995]. During the three-year transition period from TEFRA to PPS, Medicare 
agreed to use regional, rather than national, averages to determine hospital costs to 
ease the adjustment for hospitals located in regions with above-average costs as a re- 
sult of chronic labor shortages. Under this system of "blended" rates, the proportion 
of the prospective rate that was based on a hospital's historical costs declined over 
time as the share of the rate determined by national average rates increased. 
Over time, however, HCFA's accommodative policy toward the hospital indus- 
try became increasingly restrictive. Medicare margins began to decline in 1986 and 
fell steadily until 1993. Adjustments to PPS rates fell from double digits in the pro- 
gram's first two years to 3.3 percent in FY1987 and lagged behind the overall rate 
of medical inflation for the remainder of the decade [Altman 1995]. In retrospect, 
the generous rates of payment under PPS designed to reassure providers that the 
new payment system would remain "budget neutral" in its first years seem insignifi- 
cant, for Medicare reaped considerable savings under the new system as hospitals 
changed their behavior to conform to the incentives of a case-based reimbursement 
system: admissions declined, as did the average length of stay for patients [Russell 
1989]. As HCFA officials began to tighten the financial screws on inpatient reim- 
bursement during the shift from individual historical costs to lower national and re- 
gional rates, PPS operating margins for hospitals fell precipitously; by 1990, most 
hospitals were losing money on Medicare patients [Guterman, Altman, and Young 
1990]. This was not an unanticipated consequence, for as Karen Davis and Diane 
Rowland [1986, 79] note, "the principal savings in the system come from limiting 
increases in the average payment rate over time." 
The implementation of Medicare's PPS also increased fragmentation within the 
hospital industry by linking the level of payment to a hospital's location (e.g., urban 
vs. rural), teaching status, and the nature of the population served. Opposition to 
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PPS within the hospital industry varied considerably, as some institutions prospered 
while others struggled to survive [ProPAC 1994; Rosko and Carpenter 1994]. Hos- 
pitals in rural areas were seriously affected by PPS, and the rapid rise in the number 
of rural hospital closures during the 1980s exacerbated concerns about access to 
care in rural America [Christianson, Moscovice, and Tao 1993; Goody 1993]. Ru- 
ral institutions began to lose money on Medicare patients in FY1987 and continued 
to experience net operating margins into the early 1990s [Altman 1995]. In contrast, 
urban government hospitals, voluntary institutions, and proprietary hospitals fared 
quite well under PPS despite declining operating margins. Indeed, while both pro- 
prietary and voluntary hospitals reported net losses on Medicare patients from 
FY1991 to FY1993, both recorded net operating profits by FY1994 [Altman 1995]. 
Overall, the introduction of Medicare's PPS led to statistically significant reductions 
in the length of hospital stays, cost per admission, labor cost per admission, and per 
capita hospital admissions by the mid-1980s [Sloan, Morrisey, and Valvona 1988]. 
Under PPS, a hospital's fiscal health depended on both its case mix (i.e., the se- 
verity of patients' illnesses) and its payer mix (i.e., the percentage of hospital reve- 
nues generated by different third-party insurers). Institutions serving predominantly 
poor inner-city communities were increasingly hard pressed to make ends meet by 
the end of the decade, despite Medicare's efforts to compensate institutions that 
treated a "disproportionate share" of indigent patients. Since these institutions typi- 
cally had fewer patients with private health insurance plans that still paid on the ba- 
sis of charges, many inner-city hospitals found it difficult to emulate the cost- 
shifting behavior of their suburban counterparts, in which privately insured patients 
were charged higher rates than those covered by Medicare or Medicaid (see Abra- 
ham [1993] for an excellent account of the difficulties facing such institutions). 
PPS fundamentally changed the financial incentives for hospital reimbursement. 
Under the cost-based system in effect from 1966 to 1982, hospitals sought to keep 
patients in the hospital for as long as possible, for longer stays and additional clini- 
cal interventions increased revenues. Medicare's PPS contributed to the restructur- 
ing of the hospital industry, as the number of hospital beds, inpatient admissions, 
inpatient days, length of stay, and average occupancy rates fell during the 1980s, as 
hospitals scrambled to transfer patients to more profitable "outpatient" settings. 
Hospitals also acquired a financial incentive to discipline physicians who "wasted 
resources" by keeping patients in the hospital too long, for additional services repre- 
sented either lost profits or an operating loss [Iglehart 1993]. Institutions soon 
adapted to the new payment system, leading to rising revenue margins for commu- 
nity hospitals in the late 1980s and early 1990s despite the fact that annual increases 
in Medicare payments per hospital discharge fell from 6.6 percent in FY1990 to 3.5 
percent in FY1994 [Altman 1995]. Hospitals employed small armies of professional 
coders whose sole task was to determine the most appropriate and most profitable 
DRG for each Medicare patient admitted or treated. The use of creative DRG cod- 
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ing to inflate hospital revenues (known as "upcoding" or "DRG creep") added an 
entire consulting industry to the health care technostructure to enable hospitals to 
"enhance" their Medicare revenues. 
Conclusion 
As Galbraith [1956, 136] argues, "The support of countervailing power has be- 
come in modem times perhaps the major domestic peacetime function of the federal 
government." Until the creation of large federal entitlements to provide health care 
for the elderly and low-income residents in the 1960s, however, congressional poli- 
cymakers had few incentives to intervene in the internal affairs of the hospital indus- 
try. By the early 1970s, the growing cost of government-sponsored health insurance 
led to the development of new federal policies aimed at restructuring the incentives 
of the reimbursement process. The transformation in the role of the state in financ- 
ing health care was accompanied by new institutional developments designed to en- 
hance its control over hospital payment decisions. As Bruce Vladeck [1981, 215] 
argues, this was inevitable, for "extensive regulation of health care providers is the 
price we pay for not having national health insurance." 
The evolution of health care financing policy illustrates a larger point about the 
effectiveness of countervailing power, for the growth of federal intervention was 
unable either to solve the government's own fiscal crisis or to stem the long-term 
trend toward increased health care spending. While TEFRA and PPS reduced the 
use of inpatient hospital services, hospitals adapted to the new fiscal climate by 
shifting patients to more profitable outpatient settings or to home care, which con- 
tinued to operate on a cost-based, fee-for-service basis. The federal government's 
shift from passive accommodation of providers' interests in the 1950s and 1960s to 
the use of centralized behavioral controls in the 1980s led hospitals to reinvent 
themselves, for Medicare accounted for more than 40 percent of the average com- 
munity hospital's gross patient revenues [Iglehart 1993]. The policy changes in 
Medicare reimbursement, which began in the early 1970s, created a "ratchet effect" 
[see Higgs 1987] as the Medicare program's growing share of the federal budget 
and its central role in preserving the balanced budget agreement led to a steady esca- 
lation of federal influence over the hospital industry. The failure of early govern- 
ment cost-containment initiatives led to calls for more sweeping government 
controls-further cutbacks in provider payments were a cornerstone of the 1997 bal- 
anced budget agreement between the Clinton administration and the Republican con- 
gressional leadership. 
Although the federal government's relationship with the hospital industry re- 
sembled the "close fusion" between the state and the technostructure described by 
Galbraith [1971] at mid-century, over the past two decades the interests of federal 
policymakers and industry representatives diverged. From the 1940s through the 
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1960s, "members of the technostructure work[ed] closely with their public counter- 
parts . . . in advising them of their needs" [Galbraith 1971, 395]. By the early 
1970s, however, the health care technostructure faced an increasingly autonomous 
state whose needs had changed. New policies, in short, had produced a new style of 
politics [Brown 1983], as the federally subsidized cost explosion in the health care 
industry led to the development of a new policy image that placed cost containment, 
not improved access, at the top of the nation's health policy agenda. Hospitals had 
won the battle over national health insurance in earlier decades, but in the long run, 
incremental changes in health care financing steadily eroded the industry's fiscal and 
managerial autonomy. 
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